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COMMENT
TERMINATING ACTIVE EFFORTS:
THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT
MISFIRES IN J.S. V. STATE
MARK ANDREWS*
This Comment evaluates the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in
J.S. v. State, which held that the Department of Health and Social
Services may terminate “active efforts” to reunify an Indian family
where a parent has subjected the child to sexual abuse. The Com-
ment suggests that the court’s reasoning was unfounded given the
guarantees of the Indian Child Welfare Act and the current state
of federal law.  The Comment suggests alternatives to the court’s
ruling to protect children while also preserving a parent’s privilege
against self-incrimination.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In J.S. v. State,1 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the De-
partment of Health and Social Services (“Department”) may, un-
der certain circumstances, terminate “active efforts” to reunify a
parent and an Indian child.2  The Department’s duty to make “ac-
tive efforts” normally arises when it takes an Indian child into pro-
tective custody.3  The Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”)4 re-
quires the agency to attempt reunification of the torn family.5 J.S.
Copyright © 2003 by Mark Andrews.  This Comment is also available on the
Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/20ALRAndrews.
* Associate Counsel for Tanana Chiefs Conference, Fairbanks, Alaska; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1975; B.A., Miami University, 1971.
1. 50 P.3d 388 (Alaska 2002).
2. Id. at 392.
3. Id. at 391 (discussing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §
1912(d) (2000)).
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
5. Id.  § 1912(d).
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held, however, that when a parent has subjected a child to sexual
abuse, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”)6 re-
lieves the Department of its duty to reunify.7
J.S. makes a radical, unsupported, and unnecessary departure
from the guarantees of ICWA.  Other states have found alterna-
tives that protect the child, preserve the state’s ability to require
therapy by the parent, and yet avoid dilution of the parent’s right
to reunification efforts.
II. THE J.S. OPINION
In J.S., Jack,8 the father of three Indian boys, was convicted of
sexually assaulting his three sons and was sentenced to nineteen
years in prison with four years suspended.9  The Department took
custody of the boys and petitioned to terminate Jack’s parental
rights.10  The trial court found that Jack’s long incarceration and the
needs of his children justified this termination.11
It was undisputed that at the time of the termination the De-
partment had failed to make any efforts to reunify Jack and his
sons.12  The trial court held that to avoid termination of his rights,
Jack would have to admit his offense against his sons and enroll in
treatment; the court then kept the record open for sixty days while
the Department offered Jack a treatment plan.13  The agency’s
treatment plan required that Jack accept responsibility for his be-
havior, apologize in writing to his sons, drop the pending appeals of
his criminal conviction, and enroll in a sexual offender treatment
program.14 Jack would neither accept responsibility for the offenses
nor drop the appeals.15  After further proceedings, the trial court
terminated Jack’s parental rights.16
The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the termination and ap-
proved the discontinuance of “active efforts.”17  The court observed
6. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of
42. U.S.C.).
7. J.S., 50 P.3d at 392.
8. “Jack” is the pseudonym assigned by the Alaska Supreme Court to the fa-
ther in this case.  Id. at 389 n.1.
9. Id. at 389-90.
10. Id. at 390.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 390-91.
16. Id. at 391.
17. Id. at 392.
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that in 1997, ASFA amended the general federal requirement that
the State must make “reasonable efforts” toward reunification in
termination cases; ASFA allowed the state agency to stop reunifi-
cation efforts when the parent subjected the child to sexual abuse.18
The court concluded:
Although this case is not governed by ASFA, that act is useful in
providing guidance to congressional policy on child welfare is-
sues.  It suggests that in situations of adjudicated devastating
sexual abuse, such as this one, a person’s fundamental right to
parent is not more important than a child’s fundamental right to
safety.19
Therefore, the court held that “active efforts” at reunification were
not required after a judicial finding that a parent subjected a child
to sexual abuse.20
III.  THE COURT’S ANALYSIS FAILS
A. The Court Reached the “Active Efforts” Issue Unnecessarily.
The Alaska Supreme Court has issued a long line of decisions
justifying minimal reunification efforts when the parent is uncoop-
erative.21  Accordingly, the trial court in J.S. was within its discre-
tion to require Jack to attend treatment.22  However, the further
requirement that Jack admit guilt was unnecessary.23  If Jack re-
fused treatment, for whatever reason, that refusal alone would jus-
tify the termination of parental rights under existing case law.24
The presence of two standards, “reasonable efforts” and “ac-
tive efforts,” is easily resolved given the provisions of the underly-
ing statutes.  ASFA permits a state to discontinue reasonable ef-
forts to reunify a family25; ICWA contains no similar permission
18. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2000); ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.086(c) (Michie 2002) (codifying an exception to the reasonable efforts re-
quirement as applied to children in need of aid)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., E.A. v. State, Div. of Family and Youth Servs., 46 P.3d 986, 991
(Alaska 2002) (citing earlier cases that allow a parent’s willingness to cooperate to
be considered in deciding whether the state has made active efforts).
22. J.S., 50 P.3d at 390.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., E.A. 46 P.3d at 991.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2000) (allowing cessation of reasonable efforts
if the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, which includes
abandonment, torture, and chronic sexual abuse).
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with regard to active efforts.26  The usual rule of statutory construc-
tion is that the reviewing court resorts first to the plain language of
the statute; if the language is unambiguous, the court need not in-
quire further.27  To that end, the court in J.S. should have recog-
nized that Congress intended to create two different standards for
two different sets of children.
Why, then, did the Alaska Supreme Court reach the ruling
that ASFA is a guide to ICWA?  The key lies in a footnote.28  Jack
argued that when the court and the Department required him to
admit to the criminal charges, the State violated his privilege
against self-incrimination.29  If that was in fact the case, the trial
court should not have given the Department the additional sixty
days to demonstrate “active efforts”; those efforts, regardless of
their content, would violate Jack’s constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.30  Thus, the substantive content of the plan
would not make a difference until the overall unconstitutionality of
the plan was cured.
Instead of facing this issue directly, the Alaska Supreme Court
chose to moot the constitutional issue, holding that the Depart-
ment had no reunification duty at all.31  In the complete absence of
such a duty, the constitutionality of the trial court order ceased to
be an issue.  But in so ruling, the court ignored the complete dearth
of authority supporting its interpretation, ignored three earlier de-
cisions from other state appellate courts that resolved the same is-
sue successfully,32 and ignored the guidance of a United States Su-
preme Court opinion33 issued only two weeks earlier.
B.  The Rationale in J.S. is Unsupported in Federal Law.
1. Nothing Supports the Use of ASFA to Interpret ICWA.
a.  The Plain Language of ICWA Settles Differences That
Might Arise Between the Guarantees in ICWA and Those in Other
Statutes.  ICWA provides:
26. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
27. E.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); NORMAN SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:01 (6th ed., West 2000).
28. J.S., 50 P.3d at 392 n.16.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part V.
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In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child cus-
tody proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher
standard of protection to the rights of the parents or Indian cus-
todian of an Indian child than the rights provided under this sub-
chapter, the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Fed-
eral standard.34
On the facts of J.S., the guarantees to the Indian parent are lower
under ASFA than they are under ICWA.  Under ASFA, the state
agency may sometimes end its efforts to reunify the family;35 ICWA
has no similar provisions.36  The standard of protection is therefore
stronger under ICWA.  Thus, by the plain language of the federal
statutes, the protections of ICWA apply.  Accordingly, it is unnec-
essary to resort to ASFA to interpret ICWA.
b.  There is No Language in ICWA or ASFA Linking the
Two Laws.  When Congress wants to establish a relationship be-
tween different sets of state and federal guarantees, it does so ex-
pressly.  The most notable example in this arena is the ICWA pro-
vision cited above, which assures parents of Indian children that
they will have the protections of either ICWA or another applica-
ble law, whichever is stronger.37  Congress has not codified any lan-
guage connecting ICWA and ASFA to alter this guarantee.  In ef-
fect, the Alaska Supreme Court drew its connection out of silence.38
c.  The Legislative History of ASFA Does Not Support the
Supreme Court’s Conclusion.  The legislative history of the 1997
modification to the “reasonable efforts” requirement shows a lack
of congressional intent to use the provisions of ASFA to interpret
ICWA.  One of the main proponents of the 1997 bill was Senator
Mike DeWine.39  One of his primary concerns was that the 1980
“reasonable efforts” standard had never been defined and that this
injured children who languished too long in state custody.40  At the
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (2000).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2000).
36. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
37. Id. § 1921.
38. On July 15, 2003, Representative Don Young introduced legislation that
would substantially amend ICWA.  H.R. 2750, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
Among other things, the amendments would reinforce the rule that no other law
modifies the duty of active efforts.  See id. § 7.  The amendment to 25 U.S.C. §
1912(d) would read: “The active efforts required under this subsection shall not be
abridged by any other Federal or State law. . .”  Id.  This amendment would pre-
clude the use of ASFA to abridge such rights in ICWA.
39. See 143 Cong. Rec. S12668-74 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (Statement of Sen.
DeWine) [hereinafter 143 Cong. Rec. S12668-74].
40. E.g., id.; 143 Cong. Rec. S11175 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1997) (Statement of
Sen. DeWine); 143 Cong. Rec. S551 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (Statement of Sen.
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time, state agencies resolved all doubts on the side of reunification,
to the point where children died in foster care and otherwise risked
serious injury.41  In his floor testimony, Senator DeWine limited his
comments to the “reasonable efforts” standard; he made no com-
ment on ICWA, and did not draw a connection between ICWA
and the pending amendments.42
In addition, the 1997 House Report explained its rationale for
modifying “reasonable efforts.”43  The Report stated that the bill
would require states to define “aggravated circumstances,” such as
torture of a child, to allow a more expeditious termination of pa-
rental rights.44  Under its “Reason for Change,” the Report pointed
to the lack of a statutory definition for “reasonable efforts” and the
resulting confusion among the states in administering the law.45
The Report, however, mentioned neither ICWA nor its “active ef-
forts” requirement.  Again, the Alaska Supreme Court drew its
conclusion despite congressional silence.
2. J.S. Disregards Contrary United States Supreme Court
Precedent on the Nature of the Federal Guarantees Contained in
ASFA.  The Alaska Supreme Court sought guidance on substantive
law from a statute that grants no substantive rights.  The predeces-
sor to ASFA was the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980 (“AACWA”).46  In Suter v. Artist M.,47 the United States
Supreme Court examined whether AACWA granted private indi-
viduals substantive rights that allowed them to sue state officials.48
The Court held that AACWA created a set of relationships only
between the states and the federal government.49  Although
AACWA contained extensive and detailed provisions governing
DeWine); 142 Cong. Rec. S5710-12 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (Statement of Sen.
DeWine).  The author has not reviewed every comment that Senator DeWine of-
fered on the series of bills that eventually became the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997; however, nothing in the ASFA comments reviewed suggested that
Senator DeWine wanted to change the “active efforts” provisions of ICWA.
41. 143 Cong. Rec S12669 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (Statement of Sen.
DeWine).
42. 143 Cong. Rec. S12668-74.
43. H.R. REP. 105-77, at 7 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2742-
43.
44. Id.
45. H.R. REP. 105-77, at 11 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2743.
46. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
47. 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
48. Id. at 350.
49. Id. at 358.
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the contents of a state plan for children and families, those provi-
sions were only preconditions to the award of grant money to the
states.50  The right to enforce grant conditions belonged to the
United States.51  Accordingly, the provisions did not give substan-
tive rights to individuals to sue when the state violated the grant
conditions.52
In light of Suter’s ruling that ASFA grants no substantive
rights to individuals, it is difficult to see how the Alaska Supreme
Court could find that ASFA imposes substantive disabilities on
those same individuals.53  Federal law still requires the state plan to
include reasonable efforts at reunification, but this requirement is
only a condition of a federal grant.54  Therefore, ASFA affects rela-
tions between the Alaska Department of Health and Social Serv-
ices and the federal agency that administers the grant program, but
not between the Department and private individuals.55  Given that
AFSA gives private individuals no federal rights, it is difficult to
see how the Alaska Supreme Court would give ASFA a construc-
tion that imposes substantive disabilities on those individuals.
3. The J.S. Rationale Contradicts Rules Governing the Con-
struction of Statutes.  First, the rule that “statutes are to be con-
strued liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit” has existed for almost ninety years.56
J.S. disregards this bedrock principle, which would have effectively
50. Id. at 358, 361-62.
51. Id. at 360.
52. Id. at 363-64.
53. A congressional amendment to a statute will be construed to have adopted
the settled judicial interpretation of that statute.  See Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 567 (1988) (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (finding
that when Congress reenacted a statute with substantially the same language as
the original statute, the accepted judicial interpretation applies to the reenacted
statute)).  In 1994, Congress amended the Social Security Act overruling the test
used in Suter to determine whether a private right of action is available under a
federal statute.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (2000).  However, this amendment did not
overrule the specific result in Suter that a private right of action is unavailable un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).  Id.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000).
55. See Pub. L. No. 96-272 § 470 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
670).
56. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); see
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918) (supporting the
general rule that statutes passed to benefit Indian tribes should be construed lib-
erally).
111703 ANDREWS.DOC 12/29/03  2:02 PM
312 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:2
resolved the issue in the case.  ASFA applies to all children;57
ICWA applies only to Indian children.58  Additionally, an Indian
parent has more protection under ICWA than under ASFA.59  Un-
der such circumstances, the rules of construction favor application
of the higher standards of ICWA and thus provide greater protec-
tion for the Indian parent.  The Alaska Supreme Court has fol-
lowed this rule of statutory construction in the past,60 but did not
explain why it was not following this rule in J.S.
Second, in J.S., the court disregarded its long-standing rule
that “no judicial exception to ICWA can be created.”61  Specifi-
cally, the court has previously expressed its “serious policy reserva-
tions concerning the creation of judicial exceptions to the plain
language of ICWA.”62  However, there was no compelling reason in
J.S. to avoid this rule of construction because ASFA and ICWA
never reference each other.  Third, a threat to the privilege against
self-incrimination raises a serious issue.  Alternatives were and are
available to require the parent to attend treatment, to protect the
child, and to avoid damage to ICWA.63
IV.  OTHER JURISDICTIONS RESOLVE THE ISSUE
Serious issues concerning a person’s privilege against self-
incrimination were raised in J.S.  Although the court could not
avoid this issue, the court did not need to endanger the children or
dilute the guarantees of ICWA.  The United States Constitution
57. The pertinent sections of ASFA cover “all children.”  42 U.S.C. §
625(a)(1) (2000).  The requirements for a state case plan do not limit coverage to
less than all children.  42 U.S.C. § 671 (a).
58. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902 (2000).
59. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (substantive rights in pending court proceedings), §
1913 (rights for voluntarily relinquishing parental rights), § 1914 (right to petition
to invalidate some proceedings for violation of ICWA), § 1916 (rights to return of
the child in certain circumstances).
60. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska 1999) (“Courts must resolve
ambiguities in statutes affecting the rights of Native Americans in favor of Native
Americans.”).
61. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 827 (Alaska 1995).
62. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989).  The court ex-
pressed such reservations as early as 1982.  A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1173
(Alaska 1982) (“[W]e find no compelling basis for implying any other [excep-
tions].”).  In J.S. itself, the court described an earlier opinion as “holding that
there was no compelling reason for implying a judicially created exception to
ICWA.”  50 P.3d 388, 392 n.12 (Alaska 2002) (citing A.B.M., 651 P.2d at 1173).
63. See discussion infra Part VI.
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grants a privilege against self-incrimination64 that applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.65 In accordance with
the privilege, individuals may refuse to answer questions in any
proceeding “civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the an-
swers might incriminate [the individual] in future criminal pro-
ceedings.”66  The Alaska Constitution similarly grants a privilege
against self-incrimination.67  However, statements made during sex
offender therapy are not privileged.68
Prior to J.S., the Alaska Supreme Court had seen only one
challenge questioning parental rights and self-incrimination.  In
Nelson v. Jones,69 the court held that conditioning future visitation
upon an admission of sexual abuse lies within the discretion of the
trial court.70  However, the father had stipulated to a finding of
abuse.71  Thus, whatever privilege against self-incrimination the fa-
ther might have had, he waived it when he agreed to the stipula-
tion. The appellate decision concerned the father’s efforts to vacate
the stipulated order.72  However, in J.S. Jack prosecuted the issue of
self-incrimination, while the father in Nelson did not; thus, the re-
sult in Nelson is not helpful to resolving J.S.
Three other jurisdictions have examined this problem and
concluded that the trial court may not terminate parental rights, or
deny visitation, based on a parental refusal to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination.73  However, these courts also held that a
court may do so based on a parental failure to undergo effective
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
65. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
66. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
67. ALASKA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
68. See Beaver v. State, 933 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that disclosure of statements made voluntarily during prison sex offender treat-
ment regarding other crimes did not violate the prisoner’s Fifth Amendment
rights); Christina L. Lewis, The Exploitation of Trust: The Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege in Alaska as Applied to Prison Group Therapy, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 295,
296 (2001) (“There is no existing judicial opinion on legal precedent in Alaska in-
terpreting [the psychotherapist-patient privilege] in the context of group ther-
apy.”).
69. 781 P.2d 964, 969-70 (Alaska 1989).
70. Id. at 970.
71. Id. at 966 (stating that the father agreed to the stipulation in open court,
but said that he was not admitting guilt).
72. Id. at 967.
73. See, e.g., In re Clifford M., 577 N.W.2d 547 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998); Mullin v.
Phelps, 647 A.2d 714 (Vt. 1994); In re the Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879 (Minn.
1987).
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treatment.74  All three decisions overturned lower court decisions
that conditioned treatment or visitation upon a waiver of the
privilege against self-incrimination.  Further, although the courts
noted the difficult position of the parent, all held that the safety of
the children was the paramount consideration.
Although none of the three decisions was based on ICWA, all
were decided after the creation of the “reasonable efforts” stan-
dard contained in AACWA and one was decided after passage of
ASFA.  Notably, none of the courts found it necessary to hold that
the “reasonable efforts” provisions of either AACWA or ASFA
excused the duty of active efforts in ICWA.
A. Minnesota: In re the Welfare of J.W.
In In re the Welfare of J.W.,75 the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed a trial court order that required parents to undergo psy-
chological evaluations that would ultimately require them to ex-
plain the death of a child present in their home.76  During the first
part of the proceedings, the parents refused to answer questions
about the death of the child.77  However, as a discovery sanction,
the trial court deemed it admissible that either or both parents
were responsible for the child’s death.78  Since the remaining chil-
dren were at high risk of physical abuse, the trial court placed them
in foster care.79
At a later disposition hearing, the court ordered the parents to
undergo psychological examinations.80  The court ordered that such
evaluations “[would] include the explanation of the death of [the 2-
year-old nephew], consistent with the medical findings.”81  The par-
ents appealed this disposition order on the grounds that it violated
their privilege against self-incrimination.82  At the time of appeal,
the trial to terminate parental rights had not been held.83
74. See, e.g., In re Clifford M., 577 N.W.2d at 554; Mullin, 647 A.2d at 734;
J.W., 415 N.W.2d at 884.
75. 415 N.W.2d 879.
76. Id. at 880-81.  The death was apparently caused by an adult in the house-
hold.  The children in custody were the parents’ own, but the child who died was
not.
77. Id. at 880.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 881.  The discovery sanctions were appealed but upheld.  Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the trial court could
not require that the parents incriminate themselves as part of a dis-
position order.84  However, this ruling did not leave the children
unprotected:
[T]he trial court’s order, to the extent it requires appellants to
incriminate themselves, violates appellants’ Fifth Amendment
rights and is unenforceable.  This means that appellants’ non-
compliance with the order requiring them to divulge details of
the nephew’s death to psychologists cannot be used as
grounds . . . for termination of parental rights nor for keeping
[the other two children] in foster care. . . .
But this is as far as the privilege extends protection.  While the
state may not compel therapy treatment that would require ap-
pellants to incriminate themselves, it may require the parents to
undergo treatment.  Therapy, however, which does not include
incriminating disclosures, may be ineffective; and ineffective
therapy may hurt the parents’ chances of regaining their chil-
dren.  These consequences lie outside the protective ambit of the
Fifth Amendment.85
The court held that the best interests of the children took priority
over many of the rights of the parents.86  To that end, the parents
could not prevent the State from presenting evidence of how the
child died or from seeking further orders to keep the children in
foster care.87  The parents, however, retained the power to offer
evidence that they had overcome their abusive and violent back-
ground.88  Specifically, the court said:
In the lexicon of the Fifth Amendment, the risk of losing the
children for failure to undergo meaningful therapy is neither a
“threat” nor a “penalty” imposed by the state.  It is simply a con-
sequence of the reality that it is unsafe for children to be with
parents who are abusive and violent.89
The court finally observed that if the State believed that therapy
would help the parents improve and thus regain their children, the
State could grant the parents immunity.90  The parents could then
participate in therapy without fear of criminal sanctions.91
84. Id. at 883.
85. Id. (internal citations omitted).
86. Id. at 883-84.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 884.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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B. Vermont: Mullin v. Phelps
In Mullin v. Phelps,92 the Vermont Supreme Court held that
conditioning a father’s visitation rights on an admission of sexual
abuse violated his privilege against self-incrimination.93  Mullin was
a child custody dispute that arose after a divorce decree.94  When
the proceedings began, the two sons were in the custody of the fa-
ther.95  The mother of the boys petitioned the court repeatedly for a
change in custody, alleging that the father had sexually abused the
boys.96  The court ultimately found that the father had abused his
sons and transferred custody to the mother.97
As a condition precedent to the resumption of contact with the
sons, the trial court required the father to acknowledge the sexual
abuse.98  The order stated:
Plaintiff shall have no right to a regular schedule of parent child
contact with the minor children until such time as he acknowl-
edges responsibility for his abuse of [his son], engages in appro-
priate sex offender treatment including individual and group
therapy as recommended by his therapist and visits between
himself and the child are recommended by the child’s therapist.99
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the finding that
one of the sons had been abused, and further held that this finding
was sufficient to support a transfer of custody.100 The court then
turned to the question of whether the trial court’s conditions vio-
lated the father’s privilege against self-incrimination.101  The su-
preme court reversed the trial court and suggested a constitution-
ally valid solution:
Regardless of the strength or credibility of the evidence of sexual
abuse, specifically conditioning the father’s future contact with
his sons on his admitting that he sexually abused [the son] vio-
lates [the father’s] privilege against self-incrimination.  While a
court may require abusive parents to submit to therapy, and pa-
rental rights may be terminated without violating the fifth
amendment based on the fact that the parents’ denial of their
problem prevented effective therapy, the court’s specific condi-
92. 647 A.2d 714 (Vt. 1994).
93. Id. at 716.
94. Id. at 715.
95. Id.  at 716.
96. Id. at 716-18.
97. Id. at 718-19.
98. Id. at 719.
99. Id. at 730 (Morse, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
100. Id. at 719-21.
101. Id. at 724.
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tion requiring the father to acknowledge conduct for which he
could be prosecuted must be stricken.102
This rationale recognizes the concerns raised by the appellant fa-
ther in J.S., but it also points the way out of the dilemma: when the
trial court is faced with an abusive parent who resists an admission
of guilt, there is a remedy available that protects the child but does
not violate the constitutional rights of the parent.
C.  Nebraska: In re Clifford M.
In In re Clifford M.,103 a Nebraska appellate court reversed a
termination of parental rights that was based on a finding that a
mother had refused to acknowledge that her boyfriend had sexual
contact with her daughter.104  The mother’s rehabilitation plan in-
cluded a treatment program that required her acknowledgment of
her failure to protect her children against sexual abuse.105  The
court took note of the difficulty of the issue:
[T]here is a very fine, although very important, distinction be-
tween terminating parental rights based specifically upon a re-
fusal to waive protections against self-incrimination and termi-
nating parental rights based upon a parent’s failure to comply
with an order to obtain meaningful therapy or rehabilitation,
perhaps in part because a parent’s failure to acknowledge past
wrongdoing inhibits meaningful therapy.  The latter is constitu-
tionally permissible; the former is not.106
The court acknowledged that a termination may rest lawfully on a
parent’s “failure to undergo meaningful therapy.”107  However, re-
lying on J.W. and Phelps, the court held that the trial court’s deci-
sion, which effectively ordered the parent to surrender her privi-
lege against self-incrimination, was unconstitutional.108
V. THE MCKUNE V. LILE OPINION
Two weeks before the opinion in J.S. v. State, the United
States Supreme Court issued its opinion in McKune v. Lile.109
McKune held that when a state, as a precondition for participation
in treatment, requires a prisoner to admit his history of sexual as-
102. Id. at 724-25 (citations omitted).
103. 577 N.W.2d 547 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 550.
106. Id. at 554 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 554-55.
108. Id. at 555-57.
109. 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
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sault, that requirement does not violate the prisoner’s privilege
against self-incrimination.110
In McKune, the State ordered petitioner Robert Lile, a pris-
oner close to re-entering society, to participate in a sexual abuse
treatment plan.111  As a condition of entering the program, prison-
ers were required to admit responsibility for the crimes for which
they were sentenced, as well as “all prior sexual activities,” re-
gardless of whether the activities were, or could have been, charged
as crimes.112  Prisoners who did not participate faced penalties, in-
cluding the reduction or loss of visitation, work opportunities, abil-
ity to send money home, access to the prison canteen, and other ac-
tivities.113
The plurality opinion of the Court was joined by four justices,
with one concurring in the judgment.  The result was predicated on
the fact that the penalties imposed by the treatment program were
not as severe as others already held not to violate the privilege, and
that prisoners’ claims to constitutional protection are measured
against a different standard.  Specifically, the Court held that “[t]he
consequences in question [in McKune]. . . are not ones that compel
a prisoner to speak about his past crimes despite a desire to remain
silent.”114  The Court added, “A broad range of choices that might
infringe constitutional rights in free society fall within the expected
conditions of confinement of those who have suffered lawful con-
viction.”115  Expanding on earlier case law,116the McKune court held:
A prison clinical rehabilitation program, which is acknowledged
to bear a rational relation to a legitimate penological objective,
does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination if the ad-
verse consequences an inmate faces for not participating are re-
lated to the program objectives and do not constitute atypical
and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.117
McKune and J.S. are distinguishable because of the different fo-
rums in which the deprivation occurred and because of the severity
of the deprivation itself.  The situation in McKune took place in the
criminal system and arose out of a prison’s offer of treatment to an
inmate in advance of release.118  The Department of Corrections
110. Id. at 29.
111. Id. at 30, 33-34.
112. Id. at 30.
113. Id. at 30-31, 39.
114. Id. at 36.
115. Id.
116. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
117. McKune, 536 U.S. at 37-38.
118. Id. at 30.
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would provide the treatment or remove the privileges.119  The order
in J.S. arose from a civil proceeding involving rights to the pris-
oner’s children.120  In J.S., Jack was a prisoner, but he was navigat-
ing his way through the civil justice system, where parents are af-
forded more constitutional and statutory rights.
Second, in McKune, the prisoner did not face a loss of rights
comparable to the loss of parental rights.  On refusing to accept the
conditions of treatment, the McKune petitioner faced a loss of visi-
tation, work opportunities, and other freedoms.121  In J.S., Jack
faced the loss of rights to his children.  This distinction is notewor-
thy in light of the fact that the Alaska Supreme Court has held that
the right of a parent to custody and control of his child is one of the
most basic civil liberties.122  The more serious consequences of such
a deprivation enter into the calculation of whether testimony
against oneself is coerced.
Notwithstanding these points, the Alaska Supreme Court had
a fairly clear test available to decide when a treatment plan that re-
quires the admission of a crime violates the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination.
VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO J.S.
The superior court order in J.S. violated the privilege against
self-incrimination because it conditioned the preservation of paren-
tal rights upon Jack’s admission that certain incriminating state-
ments were true.  However, reasonable alternatives were available.
A finding of sexual abuse was already in place because the De-
partment had proven its case under state law.123 Accordingly, the
trial court could have held that so long as Jack refused to attend an
effective treatment program, he was not cooperating with his case
plan and thus refusing “active efforts.”
This result preserves the ICWA mandate that the Department
must make “active efforts” at reunification and avoids grafting a
fictitious condition onto ICWA that relieves the Department of its
duty to make such efforts.  In J.S., the trial court could have effec-
tively required Jack to submit to therapy by two methods: approv-
ing the removal of the children from the home, which must include
a finding that “active efforts” are being made,124 and approving the
119. Id.
120. J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388, 389-90 (Alaska 2002).
121. 536 U.S. at 30-31, 39.
122. In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279 (Alaska 1991).
123. 50 P.3d at 390.
124. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(10) (Michie 2002).
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permanency plan, whereby the Department must describe the ac-
tive efforts it is making.125  If Jack persisted in refusing the terms of
treatment, an order that terminated parental rights could lawfully
rest on a finding that Department efforts at rehabilitation were not
successful without comment about any refusal by Jack to admit a
crime.126
Under the rationale of J.W., Mullin, and In re Clifford M., Jack
would have the choice of working to preserve his rights to his chil-
dren or deciding to prosecute his criminal appeal.  At any rate, a
lawful result would have occurred if Jack had decided to preserve
his rights in his criminal proceeding but to abandon further efforts
to preserve contact with his children.  When Jack refused to coop-
erate, his actions fell within the line of Alaska cases holding that
the Department’s burden to make further efforts falls to almost
nothing.127  Seen another way, Jack’s refusal to cooperate showed
that the efforts at rehabilitation had been unsuccessful.128
VII. CONCLUSION
J.S. v. State distorted ICWA and ASFA in an unnecessary ef-
fort to avoid constitutional issues.  It is difficult to see how J.S. can
survive in the face of silence and hostility from both federal stat-
utes and court decisions, and in the presence of reasonable and
lawful alternatives to protect children in custody.
125. Id.  § 47.10.086(3)(b).
126. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000).
127. See J.S., 50 P.3d at 392 n.16; E.A. v. State, Div. Of Family and Youth
Servs., 46 P.3d 986, 991 (Alaska 2002).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
